Deontology: Kant's categorical imperative, rights theory, contractualism (Scanlon)
Anchor (Master): Scanlon, T. M. — What We Owe to Each Other (1998)
Intuition Beginner
Deontology is the view that some actions are right or wrong in themselves, regardless of consequences. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is the greatest deontologist. His categorical imperative says: act only on rules (maxims) that you could will to be universal laws. Could you will "lying is always OK" as a universal law? No — if everyone lied, no one would believe anyone, and lying would become impossible. So lying is wrong.
Kant's second formula says: treat people as ends in themselves, never merely as means. Using someone as a tool for your goals violates their dignity as a rational being. This is why torture, slavery, and manipulation are wrong even if they produce good outcomes — the person used is treated as a thing, not as a person.
Robert Nozick argued that rights are "side constraints" — limits on what we may do to people even to maximize overall welfare. You cannot violate one person's rights to help another. T.M. Scanlon's contractualism asks a different question: could anyone reasonably reject the principles governing our actions? Morality, on this view, is about justifying ourselves to each other.
Visual Beginner
Picture three deontological frameworks side by side. Kant's categorical imperative puts your maxim under a test: could it become a universal law without undermining itself? A magnifying glass passes over each personal rule, asking whether it survives universalization.
Nozick's side constraints draw a boundary around each person. Even if crossing it would help many others, the boundary holds. Each individual appears as an inviolable zone that no calculation of overall welfare can override.
Scanlon's contractualism gathers everyone affected and asks: could any one of them reasonably reject the principle behind the act? A single valid complaint is enough to rule the principle out. No burden gets aggregated away.
Each panel answers "what makes an act wrong?" at a different level: the rule that cannot be universalized, the right that cannot be overridden, the principle that cannot be justified to everyone affected.
Worked example Beginner
Kant's own test case is the false promise. You need money urgently and know you cannot repay. You consider promising to repay anyway. Can the maxim "borrow by making a false promise" be willed as universal law?
Run the test. If everyone in need made false promises, the institution of promising would collapse — no one would believe any promise, including yours. Your maxim destroys the very practice it depends on. That is a contradiction in the will.
So the act is wrong, not because of its consequences in this particular case, but because the rule it follows could not function as a universal law. Kant's verdict: you have a perfect duty not to make false promises — no exceptions, however pressing your need.
Check your understanding Beginner
Formal definition Intermediate+
Deontology's core distinction is between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. A hypothetical imperative is conditional on a desire: if you want X, do Y. A categorical imperative binds regardless of what you happen to want — it expresses the moral law, which Kant grounds in practical reason itself. Only rational beings, who can act on principle rather than impulse, are subject to categorical imperatives, and only rational beings have the dignity that makes them ends in themselves.
The three formulations. Kant presents the categorical imperative in three interconnected formulas. The Universal Law formula — act only on maxims you could will as universal law — supplies the universalizability test: a maxim is impermissible if universalizing it generates a contradiction, either in conception (the practice the maxim relies on would cease to exist) or in the will (you could not rationally endorse the world it creates). The Humanity formula — treat humanity never merely as a means, always as an end — grounds the dignity of rational beings and yields a perfect duty not to degrade, deceive, or coerce others. The Kingdom of Ends formula — act as a legislating member of a community of rational beings — foregrounds autonomy: moral law is self-legislated by free rational agents, not imposed from outside [Kant 1785].
Perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect duties admit no exception and no latitude in execution: do not lie, do not murder, do not break promises. They specify what you must refrain from doing to others. Imperfect duties — develop your talents, help those in need — set ends you must pursue but leave wide discretion in how and when. You cannot satisfy an imperfect duty once and for all; there is always more you could do, and Kant grants latitude in choosing the occasions. This distinction is doing real work: perfect duties generate rights claims that others can demand of you, while imperfect duties generate goals that leave room for personal planning.
Ross's prima facie duties. W. D. Ross's The Right and the Good (1930) [Ross] offers a deontology-adjacent pluralism. Ross lists seven prima facie duties — fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, and non-maleficence — each of which is morally binding unless overridden by a stronger duty in the circumstances. There is no master principle for ranking them; the duty proper (what you ought to do, all things considered) requires judgment. Ross's pluralism rejects both monistic utilitarianism and the Kantian aspiration to derive all duties from a single formula [Ross].
Rights as side constraints. Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) [Nozick] translates Kantian dignity into a theory of rights. Rights function as side constraints on the pursuit of goals: you may not violate A's rights to help B, even if the net welfare gain is large. Individuals are inviolable — their lives may not be used as means to collective ends. This Kantian foundation distinguishes Nozick's libertarianism from utilitarian justifications of liberty, which protect rights only instrumentally.
Scanlon's contractualism. Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other (1998) [Scanlon] defines wrongness in terms of principles that could not be reasonably rejected by anyone affected. A principle is reasonably rejectable if someone, considering their own personal stake, could not accept it. The complaint model is individualized: no aggregation across persons. If one person bears a severe burden so that many can avoid mild ones, that person's complaint may be strong enough to reject the principle, even though the total burden imposed on them is less than the total prevented. This gives contractualism a deontological structure — it refuses to trade one person's good against another's in the manner of utilitarianism.
Agent-relative vs agent-neutral reasons. Nagel's The View from Nowhere (1986) [Nagel] distinguishes agent-neutral reasons (anyone has reason to want suffering reduced, whoever's it is) from agent-relative reasons (I have special reasons regarding my own promises, my own children, my own life projects). Deontology requires agent-relative reasons: my duty to keep my promise is not reducible to the impartial value of promise-keeping in general. Consequentialism recognizes only agent-neutral reasons — the impersonal good is the same for everyone. The debate over whether agent-relative reasons are fundamental is one of the deepest fault lines between deontology and consequentialism [Nagel].
Donagan's common morality. Alan Donagan's The Theory of Morality (1977) [Donagan] develops an alternative Kantian system grounded in a common morality principle — respect for persons as rational agents — without relying on the universalizability test. Donagan argues that the Hebrew-Christian moral tradition and Kantian ethics converge on a set of determinate duties, and that this convergence supplies a more stable foundation than the formula-driven approach.
Key argument — Kant's universalization test and O'Neill's defense Intermediate+
The universalization test is Kant's most distinctive contribution, and also the most contested. The argument proceeds by taking the agent's maxim, universalizing it, and asking whether a contradiction results. The critical question is what kind of contradiction the test detects, and whether it succeeds in ruling out only genuinely impermissible maxims.
The false-promise reconstruction. The agent's maxim is: "When I need money, I will borrow by promising to repay, with no intention of repaying." Universalize it: everyone in need makes false promises. Under this universal law, no one would believe any promise to repay, so no one would lend. The institution of promising-ones-way-to-money dissolves, and the maxim becomes impossible to act on — you could not borrow by false promising because no one would accept your promise. This is a practical contradiction: universalizing the maxim destroys the conditions the maxim presupposes.
O'Neill's defense against Mill's parody. Mill objected that the universalization test absurdly condemns harmless maxims. If "everyone tells the truth when asked a question" is universalized, Mill argued, it would sometimes produce bad consequences, so the test condemns truth-telling — an absurd result. Onora O'Neill's response (Constructions of Reason, 1989 [O'Neill]) is that Mill misunderstands the test. Universalization does not ask whether the results of universal adoption would be pleasant; it asks whether the maxim could even be acted on under its own universalization. Truth-telling universalizes without contradiction — the practice of truthful answering survives everyone doing it. The test screens for self-undermining maxims, not for uncomfortable outcomes.
Broad's paradox. C. D. Broad raised a complementary worry: some maxims that universalize without difficulty seem morally irrelevant. "Everyone goes to the door at 5 p.m." universalizes without contradiction — no one is prevented from going to the door — but it is hard to see what moral work the test is doing here. The test seems to let in too much. The debate turns on whether the test is intended as a standalone criterion of rightness or as a necessary condition: a maxim that fails universalization is impermissible, but a maxim that passes is not thereby shown to be obligatory. On this reading, the test filters out impermissible maxims but does not by itself generate duties.
Korsgaard's three readings. Christine Korsgaard (Creating the Kingdom of Ends, 1996 [Korsgaard]) distinguishes three forms the contradiction can take. A logical contradiction arises when the universalized maxim describes an impossible state of affairs — universal false-promising eliminates promising. A practical contradiction arises when the universalized maxim makes the agent's goal unachievable — if everyone ignores the needy, no one is helped, so the maxim of refusing aid undermines the practice of mutual aid that the maxim presupposes access to. A teleological contradiction arises when universalizing the maxim frustrates a natural end the agent must will as a rational being — such as self-preservation. These three readings expand the test's reach but also expose it to the Broad-style objection: the broader the notion of contradiction, the harder it is to control what the test excludes.
Bridge. The universalization test is not the whole of Kantian ethics. The humanity formula does independent work in cases where universalization is indeterminate — treating someone merely as a means is wrong even if the maxim passes universalization. Scanlon's contractualism offers a different route to similar conclusions: principles that permit exploitation can be reasonably rejected by the person exploited. What unites Kant, Nozick, and Scanlon is the refusal to reduce morality to outcome-maximization. The intermediate exercises below probe the test's limits; the master tier takes up the deeper questions of constructivism, rights theory, and the doing/allowing distinction.
Exercises Intermediate+
Kantian constructivism, rights theory, and contractualism Master
Korsgaard's Kantian constructivism. Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity (1996) [Korsgaard] reframes Kant's central question. The normative question — "why be moral?" — cannot be answered by pointing to an independent realm of moral facts, because any such pointer can itself be questioned. Korsgaard's answer is constructivist: moral obligation arises from our nature as beings who must act. To act at all is to endorse a practical identity — a conception of yourself under which you find your life worth living — and to endorse an identity is to take on the obligations it entails. The reasons we have are the reasons we give ourselves through reflective endorsement. This is Kantian because the source of normativity is autonomous self-legislation, not external authority; it is constructivist because the moral law is built up from the structure of practical agency rather than discovered as a pre-existing fact.
Rawlsian constructivism. Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) [Rawls] applies constructivist method to political philosophy. The original position, behind the veil of ignorance, is a device for constructing principles of justice that no one could reasonably reject — parties deprived of knowledge of their social position, talents, and conception of the good would agree to principles protecting basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity. Rawls explicitly frames this as Kantian constructivism: the principles are chosen under conditions that express our nature as free and equal rational beings. O'Neill's Constructions of Reason (1989) [O'Neill] extends Kantian constructivism into a theory of justice and practical reasoning, emphasizing the consistency-in-action reading of the universalization test.
Hohfeld's analysis of rights. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1919) [Hohfeld] distinguishes four normative relationships: claim-right (A is owed X by B), privilege (A has no duty not to do X), power (A can alter B's normative position), and immunity (B cannot alter A's normative position). These are strict correlatives: every claim-right corresponds to a duty in another, every privilege to a no-right, every power to a liability, every immunity to a disability. Hohfeld's framework is indispensable for precise rights analysis, because much confusion in rights talk comes from conflating these four senses — saying "I have a right to free speech" might mean a claim-right against censorship, a privilege to speak, or an immunity against having speech-restricting powers exercised over you.
Feinberg and the value of rights. Feinberg's "The Nature and Value of Rights" (1970) [Feinberg] imagines Nowheresville, a world identical to ours except that no one has rights. Residents may be kind, dutiful, and even just, but they cannot claim anything as their due. Feinberg argues that the dignity of being a rights-holder — the capacity to stand up and demand what is owed to you — is an essential component of human self-respect. Without rights, even a benevolent society lacks the moral texture that makes persons equal participants in moral life. Waldron's communitarian critique (Nonsense upon Stilts, 1987 [Waldron]) presses the opposite worry: abstract rights talk can erode the communal bonds and concrete relationships that give lives substance. Sen's "Rights and Agency" (1982) [Sen] argues that rights have consequences — respecting or violating them changes the world — and that side-constraint theories that ignore these consequences are incomplete. Glodon's Rights Talk (1991) [Glendon] warns of rights inflation: the more everything becomes a right, the less weight any particular right carries.
Natural rights and human rights. Locke's Second Treatise (1689) [Locke] grounds natural rights to life, liberty, and property in pre-political moral facts: these rights exist prior to and independent of government, and government's legitimacy depends on consent and its protection of them. Nozick's entitlement theory (acquisition, transfer, rectification) extends this into a libertarian theory of distributive justice, and his minimal state is justified only as a protector of these side-constraint rights. Rawls and Cohen press powerful critiques from the standpoint of distributive fairness (see 20.02.01). In the human-rights tradition, Griffin's On Human Rights (2008) [Griffin] grounds human rights in personhood — the capacities that make us agents with a life to lead. Nickel and Donnelly develop complementary accounts. Sen's "Elements of a Theory of Human Rights" (2004) [Sen] takes a freedom-based approach, framing human rights in terms of the capabilities they protect. Raz argues that human rights are best understood as a political practice — standards for international intervention — rather than as direct moral foundations, a view Rawls echoes in The Law of Peoples. The debate between moral-foundational and political-practice accounts remains live, as does the challenge from cultural relativism (see 31.06.03).
Scanlon's contractualism and its developments. Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other (1998) [Scanlon] defines wrong acts as those disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement. The complaint model gives each individual a veto grounded in their personal stake. Ashford and Mullen explore the implications for demandingness; Kumar extends contractualism to fanaticism and extremism; McKeever and Ridge's Principled Ethics (2006) systematizes the contractualist decision procedure. Parfit's On What Matters (2011) [Parfit] argues that Kantianism, contractualism, and consequentialism converge on a "triple theory" — an act is wrong if and only if it is disallowed by principles that no one could reasonably reject, principles that Kantian agents could consent to, and principles whose universal acceptance optimizes the good. The convergence thesis is controversial but reframes the relationship between the three traditions. Scanlon's own later work, Being Realistic about Reasons (2014) [Scanlon 2014], moves toward reasons fundamentalism — the view that reasons are irreducible and objective — and away from contractualism as a metaethical foundation, though the normative contractualist account of wrongness survives.
Doing, allowing, critique, and extensions Master
The doing/allowing distinction. The distinction between doing and allowing harm is central to deontological ethics. Foot's "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect" (1967) [Foot] introduced the trolley problem to isolate the distinction: turning the trolley to kill one instead of five seems permissible, but pushing someone onto the tracks does not, even when the outcome is identical. The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) holds that harm intended as a means to a good end is harder to justify than harm merely foreseen as a side effect. Bennett's The Act Itself (1995) [Bennett] mounts a sustained critique, arguing that the intended/foreseen distinction does not bear the moral weight placed on it. Quinn's "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences" (1989) [Quinn] refines the distinction: the morally relevant difference is between harm you directly produce and harm you merely redirect. Kamm's intricate analyses (Morality, Mortality, 1993 [Kamm]) introduce further distinctions — the doctrine of triple effect, the contrast between causing and diverting — that stress-test the doing/allowing boundary. These debates connect directly to the trolley problem unit (20.02.04).
The consequentialist critique. The most basic consequentialist objection to deontology is that side constraints are irrational when they prevent minimizing harm. If violating one right prevents five rights from being violated, why should the deontologist refuse? Nozick's own utility monster — a being that converts resources into utility so efficiently that utilitarianism would give it everything — was originally aimed at utilitarianism, but the converse challenge bites deontology: a rights monster who could absorb violations without complaint would make side constraints look equally absurd. Scheffler's The Rejection of Consequentialism (1982) [Scheffler] offers agent-centered prerogatives as a middle path — morality permits each person to give disproportionate weight to her own projects, but without the full strength of deontological constraints. The exchange between deontological constraints and agent-centered prerogatives remains one of the most productive fault lines in normative ethics.
Deontology and virtue. Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics (1999) [Hursthouse] shows that Kant was not indifferent to virtue. Kant's Doctrine of Virtue (part of The Metaphysics of Morals, 1797) treats virtue as strength of will in fulfilling imperfect duties — the capacity to act from duty despite inclination. This is a nontrivial departure from Aristotelian virtue, which grounds right action in the character of the phronimos rather than in obedience to universal law. Johnson and Herman develop contemporary Kantian virtue theory: Herman's The Practice of Moral Judgment (1993) [Herman] introduces rules of salience — learned perceptual structures that guide the Kantian agent in recognizing morally relevant features of situations. The virtue-ethics challenge is whether Kant's emphasis on duty can accommodate the role of emotion, perception, and particular judgment that Aristotelian ethics foregrounds (see 20.02.09).
Feminist critiques. Gilligan's In a Different Voice (1982) [Gilligan] argues that women's moral reasoning tends to emphasize care, responsibility, and relationships rather than the abstract rights and duties of Kantian justice reasoning. Held's Feminist Morality (1993) and Kittay's Love's Labor (1999) [Kittay] develop care ethics around relations of dependency — the fact that all human beings are at some points in their lives radically dependent on caregivers, and that this dependency is invisible to a moral theory built around autonomous rational agents. Baier's "What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?" argues for trust and relationship as central moral concepts, drawing on Hume rather than Kant. Kantian feminists respond: Herman's "Could It Be Worth Thinking About Kant on Gender?" mines Kantian resources for feminist purposes, and Okin's Rawlsian feminism shows that the constructivist framework can be turned against the gendered structures its originator took for granted. Kant's own sexism in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764) was partially recanted in later life, but the tension between Kant's universalist ethics and his gendered anthropology is a standing problem for Kantian feminism (see 30.04.04).
Kant and international ethics. Kant's Perpetual Peace (1795) [Kant 1795] projects deontological reasoning onto international relations: a league of nations, cosmopolitan right, and hospitality toward strangers are requirements of reason, not merely prudential recommendations. Kantian just war theory (Statman, Reichberg, Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars) extends the framework to the ethics of armed conflict, asking whether the categorical imperative permits war at all, and if so under what constraints. The cosmopolitanism-versus-nationalism debate in migration ethics asks whether national borders have moral significance from the standpoint of universal reason, or whether they are merely political facts that the categorical imperative would have us look past (see 30.07.03).
Connections Master
Theories of justice
20.02.01is the direct prerequisite. Rawls's constructivism and Nozick's side constraints are both developed from Kantian materials, and the debate between them reproduces, in political philosophy, the tension between the kingdom-of-ends formula and the universal-law formula. This unit supplies the ethical foundations that 20.02.01 draws on.Rights theory
20.02.02connects through Nozick's side constraints, Hohfeld's analysis, and the natural-rights tradition from Locke forward. The question of whether rights are foundational or instrumental — Kant and Nozick say foundational; utilitarians say instrumental — is the central fault line.Moral dilemmas and the trolley problem
20.02.04is the laboratory where deontological constraints are stress-tested. The doing/allowing distinction, the Doctrine of Double Effect, and Kamm's intricate case analyses all appear there in concrete form. Taurek's numbers problem and the aggregation debates are taken up from the contractualism side.The good life and eudaimonia
20.02.05connects through the contrast between Kantian duty and Aristotelian virtue. The question of whether the moral life is structured by universal law or by the cultivation of character runs through both units.Ethics of artificial intelligence
20.02.06connects through the question of whether artificial agents can be subjects of rights or duties. Kantian dignity is tied to rational agency; if AI systems exhibit rational agency, the categorical imperative may apply to how we treat them.Consequentialism
20.02.07pending is the immediate predecessor and the chief foil. Every major argument in this unit — side constraints, the doing/allowing distinction, reasonable rejectability, agent-relative reasons — is defined against the consequentialist demand to maximize aggregate good.Virtue ethics
20.02.09pending (pending, successor) is the natural hook out. Virtue ethics shares deontology's rejection of consequentialism but grounds morality in character rather than in rules or rights. Hursthouse's rapprochement between Kant and virtue, and Annas's development of neo-Aristotelian virtue, set up the contrast.
Cross-domain to law: Hohfeld's rights analysis is foundational for legal theory, and Kantian dignity underwrites contemporary human-rights law. Cross-domain to political science: Rawls's constructivist method and Scanlon's contractualism supply the conceptual architecture for much of contemporary liberal political philosophy.
Historical and philosophical context Master
Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) [Kant 1785] was written as a propaedeutic — a preliminary grounding for a full system of morals, which Kant delivered in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and the Metaphysics of Morals (1797). The Groundwork's ambition was to identify the supreme principle of morality by ordinary rational knowledge and then to establish its philosophical credentials. The three formulations emerged across the Groundwork's sections: the universal-law formula in the first, the humanity and kingdom-of-ends formulas in the second, and the argument for freedom as the ratio cognoscendi of the moral law in the third.
Kant's immediate predecessors shaped the project. The rationalist tradition from Wolff and Crusius sought moral principles in rational necessity; the British sentimentalists (Hutcheson, Hume) grounded morality in moral sense or sentiment. Kant's categorical imperative is a response to both: against the sentimentalists, Kant insists that morality is grounded in reason, not feeling; against the rationalist natural-law tradition, Kant insists that the moral law is self-legislated by autonomous practical reason, not discovered as a fact about God's will or human nature. The term "categorical imperative" itself adapts the logic of hypothetical imperatives (which Kant found in Baumgarten's textbooks) to the unconditional demands of morality.
The nineteenth century was unkind to Kantian ethics. Hegel charged that the categorical imperative was an empty formalism — it could generate no determinate duties without importing content from outside the formula. Mill argued that the universalization test collapsed into disguised consequentialism: to ask whether a maxim could be willed as universal law was just to ask whether its universal adoption would produce good consequences. These critiques pushed ethics toward utilitarianism (Mill) and historical teleology (Hegel), and Kantian ethics fell into a relative eclipse.
The twentieth-century revival came through several routes. Prichard and Ross at Oxford developed a deontological pluralism — Ross's prima facie duties (1930) owed more to intuition than to Kant, but the structural opposition to consequentialism carried the Kantian banner. Donagan's The Theory of Morality (1977) reconstructed a rigorous Kantian system from the common-morality tradition. Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) brought Kantian constructivism into political philosophy through the original position, and Rawls's students and successors — especially Korsgaard, O'Neill, and Herman — developed the constructivist program in moral philosophy through the 1980s and 1990s. Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity (1996) and Creating the Kingdom of Ends (1996) made the deepest case for Kantian constructivism as an answer to the normative question; O'Neill's Constructions of Reason (1989) provided the most rigorous defense of the universalization test against the formalism charge.
Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other (1998) emerged from a different strand of post-Rawlsian thought. Where Rawls's constructivism operated at the level of basic social institutions, Scanlon's contractualism operated at the level of individual action: wrong acts are those disallowed by principles no one could reasonably reject. The contractualist framework offered a deontological criterion that did not depend on the universalization test and that took individual complaints seriously without aggregating them. Parfit's On What Matters (2011), compiled from decades of Oxford seminars, argued that Kantianism, contractualism, and rule consequentialism converge — a thesis that reframed the relationship among all three traditions even as individual philosophers disputed the details.
The contemporary field is organized around several live disputes. The doing/allowing distinction and the Doctrine of Double Effect remain contested, with Kamm's intricate case analyses both illuminating and multiplying the puzzles. The feminist critique from Gilligan, Held, Baier, and Kittay challenges whether a morality built around autonomous rational agents can accommodate dependency, care, and relationship. The international extension of Kantian ethics — cosmopolitanism, just war theory, migration ethics — tests whether categorical imperatives can be scaled from individual action to global institutions. And the consequentialist critique of side constraints, sharpened by the trolley-problem literature and by Scheffler's agent-centered prerogatives, continues to press the question of whether deontology's refusal to minimize rights-violations is a defense of human dignity or an irrational fetishization of the agent's own moral cleanliness.
Bibliography Master
Kant, I. — Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785; Cambridge ed. 1998).
Kant, I. — Critique of Practical Reason (1788; Cambridge ed. 1997).
Kant, I. — The Metaphysics of Morals (1797; Cambridge ed. 1996).
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Ross, W. D. — The Right and the Good (Oxford University Press, 1930).
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Scanlon, T. M. — What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998).
Scanlon, T. M. — Being Realistic about Reasons (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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