42.04.05 · mathematical-logic / computability-degrees

The Arithmetical Hierarchy and Post's Theorem

shipped3 tiersLean: none

Anchor (Master): Soare 2016 *Turing Computability: Theory and Applications* (Springer) Ch. 4 and the historical notes (the arithmetical hierarchy and its properness, Post's theorem identifying the hierarchy with the jump ladder $\emptyset^{(n)}$, the index-set classification — $\mathrm{Fin}$ is $\Sigma_2$-complete, $\mathrm{Inf}$ and $\mathrm{Tot}$ are $\Pi_2$-complete, $\mathrm{Cof}$ and $\mathrm{Rec}$ are $\Sigma_3$-complete — arithmetical definability and Tarski's theorem that truth is not arithmetical, the continuation to the hyperarithmetical $\Delta^1_1$ and the analytical hierarchy $\Sigma^1_n$ with Kleene's $\mathcal O$); Rogers 1967 *Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability* (McGraw-Hill) Ch. 14-16 (the arithmetical and analytical hierarchies, completeness, the hyperarithmetical sets); Hinman 1978 *Recursion-Theoretic Hierarchies* (Springer) Ch. III-VI (the full development of the arithmetical, hyperarithmetical, and analytical hierarchies and their relativisations)

Intuition Beginner

The previous unit built a ladder of harder and harder problems by repeatedly applying the jump. This unit looks at the same ladder from a completely different angle — the angle of how you describe a set in words — and discovers it is the very same ladder. The bridge between the two views is the centrepiece, Post's theorem.

Start with the descriptions. A plain computer can settle some questions outright: it runs, it stops, it says yes or no. Call those the level-zero questions. Now climb one step. Some questions are not settle-outright, but they have the shape "there exists a witness that makes a checkable thing true" — like "does this program ever stop?", which means "is there a number of steps after which it has halted?" You cannot bound the search, but if a witness exists you will eventually find it. The flip side is "for all witnesses, a checkable thing holds" — like "does this program run forever?" These two shapes, one search and one universal check, are the first rung above plain computation.

The pattern continues. The next rung allows one search wrapped around one universal check, or the reverse. Each new rung adds one more alternation between "there exists" and "for all." Counting those alternations is counting how complicated the description has to be, and the count is a ladder that climbs forever.

Here is the surprise. This description-ladder, built purely from how the question is phrased, lines up rung for rung with the difficulty-ladder built from the jump. Adding one more alternation to your sentence is exactly the same as climbing one more step with the jump — one more "phone call to the halting problem." So the way a question is worded and the way a question is hard to compute turn out to measure the same thing. The rest of the unit makes the wording, the counting, and the match precise, and shows the ladder never collapses to a single rung.

Visual Beginner

Picture each rung as a sentence shape. The capital E means "there exists a number such that"; the capital A means "for all numbers." After the quantifiers comes a box you can check by plain computation.

   level    "there exists" form        "for all" form
   ------    ----------------------     ----------------------
   0        [ checkable box ]          [ checkable box ]      (a plain computer decides)
   1        E . [ box ]                A . [ box ]            (one search / one universal)
   2        E A . [ box ]              A E . [ box ]          (one alternation)
   3        E A E . [ box ]            A E A . [ box ]        (two alternations)
   ...      one more letter each step, alternating E and A

   The number of ALTERNATIONS between E and A is the rung.
   Repeated same letters (E E or A A) collapse to one and do not count.

Now lay the two ladders side by side. The left is the wording-ladder above; the right is the jump-ladder from the previous unit. Post's theorem says the rungs match.

wording rung what it is jump-ladder match
level 1, "there exists" what a plain computer can list the halting problem as the helper
level 2, "there exists" listable using a halting-problem helper jump of the jump, , as helper
level 3, "there exists" listable using a helper as helper
each step up one more alternation in the sentence one more jump on the ladder

Read the table as a dictionary: the left column is grammar, the right column is computation, and Post's theorem is the translation that makes them say the same thing.

Worked example Beginner

We classify three concrete questions by counting alternations, then read off where each sits.

Step 1. "Does program halt on input ?" Unfolded, this says: there exists a number of steps after which program has stopped on input . Checking "has it stopped within steps" is a plain computation. So the shape is one "there exists" wrapped around a checkable box — one search, no alternation. This is a level-one "there exists" question.

Step 2. "Does program halt on every input?" Unfolded: for all inputs , there exists a number of steps after which program has stopped on input . Now there are two quantifiers and they alternate: a "for all" on the outside, a "there exists" on the inside. One alternation puts this on level two, on the "for all" side.

Step 3. "Is the set listed by program finite?" Unfolded: there exists a bound such that for all outputs the program ever prints, is below . That is a "there exists" on the outside and a "for all" on the inside — one alternation, level two, on the "there exists" side. So finiteness sits one notch up from halting, and on the opposite side from totality.

What this tells us: you can read the difficulty of a question straight off the grammar of its cleanest description, once you push all the searches and universal checks to the front and count how many times they switch. Halting needs one search; running-on-everything needs a universal check guarding a search; finiteness needs a search guarding a universal check. Each extra switch is a genuine step up a ladder that, as the next sections prove, never folds back down.

Check your understanding Beginner

Formal definition Intermediate+

Fix the standard enumeration , the c.e. sets from 42.04.03, the oracle functionals , the jump , and the iterated jumps from 42.04.04. A computable pairing with computable inverses is fixed throughout, so finite blocks of like quantifiers contract to one.

A relation is if $$ R(\bar x) \iff \exists y_1, \forall y_2, \exists y_3 \cdots Q_n y_n; S(\bar x, y_1, \dots, y_n), $$ where is a computable () relation and the unbounded number quantifiers strictly alternate, beginning with (so if is odd, if is even). It is if it has such a prenex form beginning with , and . Bounded quantifiers (, ) may appear inside without raising the level. By convention is the class of computable relations [Soare Ch. 4]. A set is arithmetical if it is for some .

The base level matches the previous chapters: is the computable sets, is the c.e. sets (a c.e. set is , a single over a computable matrix), and is the co-c.e. sets. The relativised classes , , are defined identically with allowed to be -computable.

Closure properties hold at each level [Rogers Ch. 14]. The classes ascend, ; each is closed under finite unions and intersections, under bounded quantification, under computable substitution in the free variables, and under the leading existential quantifier (a in front of a matrix stays by contraction ); dually for and . Complementation swaps the classes: is is .

A set is -complete if and for every ; -complete is dual. A -complete set is not (else the hierarchy would collapse at level ), so completeness pins a set exactly at its level.

Counterexamples to common slips Intermediate+

  • "More quantifiers always means a higher level." Only alternations count. The relation is , not : contract the block to . Likewise bounded quantifiers do not raise the level — with computable is still , because the bounded folds into the computable matrix.

  • " is a single quantifier-shape." is defined by having both an -quantifier form and an -quantifier form, not by a normal form of its own. A set is one expressible both as and as over computable matrices; by Post's theorem these are exactly the -computable sets.

  • "." The inclusion is proper. There are sets in neither nor ; the union of the two -level classes is not closed and sits strictly inside the next . The hierarchy is finer than the / dichotomy suggests.

  • "Completeness and membership are the same." Every set is in , but only the -hardest are -complete. is but not (it is -complete); a computable set is in every yet complete for none above level .

Key theorem with proof Intermediate+

The two organising results are that the hierarchy is proper — it genuinely climbs, at every level — and Post's theorem, which identifies the syntactic ladder with the jump ladder of 42.04.04, so quantifier-alternation depth equals depth on the iterated jump.

Theorem (the hierarchy theorem and Post's theorem). For every : (i) there is a set that is not , hence and the inclusions , are strict; (ii) (Post) is c.e. in , , and is -complete.

Proof. (i) Arithmetising the definitions produces a universal set that is itself and satisfies: for every set there is with . (Replace the computable matrix by the universal Kleene predicate and quantify over its index; the alternation pattern is preserved.) Define the diagonal . Then . Were , its complement would be , so for some index . Evaluating at : , contradicting . So , whence ; since and the two differ, both inclusions into are strict, and the hierarchy does not collapse.

(ii) Argue by induction on , the base being c.e. c.e. in and computable , with complete for at the bottom. Inductive step, the equivalence first. () Suppose is c.e. in , so where the oracle computation queries . By the induction hypothesis is and its complement is ; replacing each positive oracle answer "" by its definition and each negative answer by the definition, the bounded run of the computation (finitely many queries, by the use principle of 42.04.04) becomes a finite conjunction of and conditions, hence after contraction; prefixing the outer keeps it . So .

() Suppose , say with . By the induction hypothesis is c.e. in , so is in and hence -computable; in particular an -oracle decides with one further query to the jump . Then is c.e. in once is -decidable: search , checking each by the -oracle, so is the domain of an -partial-computable function, i.e. c.e. in .

The statement follows: and are both c.e. in by Post's relativised complementation criterion (Exercise 4 of 42.04.04). Completeness: every set is c.e. in , hence by the relativised -completeness of the jump (jump theorem (ii) of 42.04.04), and ; so is -complete, completing the induction.

Bridge. Post's theorem is the foundational reason the arithmetical hierarchy and the jump ladder are not two parallel structures but one: each added unbounded quantifier alternation is exactly one application of the jump, so the sets are precisely the sets c.e. in and is the -complete set — this is exactly jump theorem (ii) of 42.04.04 read inductively along . The diagonalisation that proves properness is the same self-application that gave in 42.04.02, now run against the universal set at every level, which generalises the single halting diagonal to an unbounded tower. The equivalence is dual to the / split: being computable from the -th jump is being decidable both with one search and with one universal check over . This builds toward Tarski's undefinability of truth in the Advanced results, where the full truth set escapes every level, and it appears again in the priority method 42.04.06, where the sets — the -computable sets, by the limit lemma — are exactly the approximable sets the finite-injury constructions exploit; putting these together, the central insight is that one operator, the jump, generates both the computational ladder and its syntactic shadow.

Exercises Intermediate+

Advanced results Master

The hierarchy is proper and aligned with the jump; the results below fix the index-set completeness levels, identify the arithmetical sets with first-order definability and locate truth strictly above the hierarchy, and continue the construction transfinitely into the hyperarithmetical and analytical levels.

Theorem 1 (Post's theorem in full; the jump as the hierarchy engine). For every : is c.e. in is c.e. in some set; ; and is -complete, hence properly (in ) [Soare Ch. 4]. The iterated jumps are therefore exactly the -complete sets at successive levels, and the relativisation principle of 42.04.04 gives the same statements over any base: is c.e. in . Quantifier-alternation depth and jump depth are one invariant. The -completeness is what makes "complete for level " a robust notion: degrees stratify the arithmetical sets exactly as the hierarchy does.

Theorem 2 (arithmetical first-order definable; Tarski's undefinability of truth). A set is arithmetical (in some ) iff it is definable by a first-order formula in the standard structure [Hinman Ch. IV]. The hierarchy levels are exactly the bounded-quantifier-prefix complexity of such formulas. But the truth set is not arithmetical: by Tarski's theorem any arithmetical set is for a fixed , while a putative arithmetical truth predicate could be diagonalised — applying the fixed-point lemma of 42.01.09 pending to its negation yields a sentence asserting its own falsity, a contradiction. Concretely computes every uniformly (each statement is decided by truth), so it lies strictly above every level of the hierarchy. This is the semantic ceiling: provability in a c.e. theory is and incomplete 42.01.09 pending, whereas truth is not arithmetical at all, and the gap between them is the precise content of the contrast between the first incompleteness theorem and the undefinability theorem.

Theorem 3 (index-set completeness classification). The natural index sets occupy exact levels and are complete there [Rogers Ch. 14]: is -complete; and are -complete; and are -complete; is . The completeness proofs are uniform s-m-n constructions coding a generic level- predicate into the structural property; Rice's theorem (every index set other than and is undecidable, or its complement) is the level- shadow of this classification, and the Rice-Shapiro theorem characterising the c.e. () index sets is its level- refinement. The classification is the standard testbed: it shows the hierarchy is populated with naturally arising complete sets at and beyond.

Theorem 4 (the hyperarithmetical hierarchy and ). Iterating the jump along the computable (recursive) ordinals continues the hierarchy transfinitely: using Kleene's system of notations for ordinals (the Church-Kleene ordinal, the least non-computable ordinal), define for by and at limits [Hinman Ch. V]. The hyperarithmetical sets are those computable from some , ; the Kleene-Souslin theorem identifies them with , the sets both and in the analytical hierarchy. Hyperarithmetical is to arithmetical as the effective Borel sets are to the finite Borel levels: the arithmetical hierarchy is the finite part, hyperarithmetical the effective-countable-ordinal part, and the exact ceiling of the recursive iteration.

Theorem 5 (the analytical hierarchy). Allowing quantification over functions (or sets) of numbers gives the analytical hierarchy: is if with arithmetical, the dual, and by alternating function quantifiers over an arithmetical matrix [Rogers Ch. 16]. The sets are the effective coanalytic sets, with Kleene's normal form and the boundedness and basis theorems; hyperarithmetical (Theorem 4); and the analytical hierarchy is proper. This is the second floor above the arithmetical one: number quantifiers build , the jump iteration along builds the hyperarithmetical , and a single function quantifier jumps to , far above everything the number-quantifier ladder reaches. The set itself is -complete, the canonical object at the base of the analytical hierarchy.

Synthesis. The arithmetical hierarchy is the foundational reason definability and computability are the same measurement taken twice: a set's quantifier-alternation depth in arithmetic is its depth on the jump ladder, and this is exactly Post's theorem — is c.e. in , is , is -complete — so the iterated jump of 42.04.04 is the engine that climbs both ladders at once. Properness is the relativised halting diagonal of 42.04.02 run against the universal set at every level, which generalises the single into an unbounded non-collapsing tower; putting these together, the hierarchy theorem and Post's theorem are one phenomenon seen syntactically and computationally. The arithmetical sets are precisely the first-order-definable subsets of , and truth is dual to this in the sharpest way — not arithmetical at all, lying above every — which is the central insight separating Gödel incompleteness (provability is , 42.01.09 pending) from Tarski undefinability (truth is non-arithmetical), and the bridge by which the limit-computable sets feed the finite-injury approximations of the priority method 42.04.06. The continuation past is the same construction transfinite: the jump iterated along Kleene's up to gives the hyperarithmetical sets, and a function quantifier lifts to the analytical hierarchy where is -complete — the arithmetical hierarchy is the first finite stretch of a ladder that, by the relativisation principle, repeats its own structure at every height.

Full proof set Master

Proposition 1 (closure and the ascending inclusions). For each : is closed under , , leading , bounded quantification, and computable substitution; ; and .

Proof. Complementation is by pushing negation through the prefix, flipping each quantifier and negating the computable matrix (which stays computable), turning the form into a form. Leading closure is quantifier contraction (Exercise 3). Closure under : prenex the two forms with disjoint bound variables and merge — for interleave matching quantifiers, for likewise, using that and the matrix combination stays at the matrix level. Bounded quantification folds into the computable matrix since and of a computable relation are computable. Computable substitution replaces the matrix by the computable . For the inclusion, a relation is also : it is (prefix a vacuous quantifier or absorb), and its complement is ... more directly and by prefixing a dummy , so ; symmetrically .

Proposition 2 (universal set and the hierarchy theorem). There is a relation universal for sets, and the diagonal .

Proof. Every set is where ranges over computable matrices, uniformly indexed by via the Kleene predicate: take or any fixed universal computable relation. Set ; this is as a relation in and enumerates all sets as varies. If were then , so for some ; then , contradicting . So .

Proposition 3 (Post's theorem, successor step). is c.e. in .

Proof. () with . By induction is -complete, so (as ); thus is -decidable (one oracle query to decide , then negate). Then of the -partial-computable function searching until holds, so is c.e. in . () . A converging oracle computation uses at finitely many points (use principle, 42.04.04); replacing each positive query "" by its definition and each negative query by its definition expresses " via a length- run with this query pattern" as a finite Boolean combination of and matrices, itself after contraction; the outer keeps it .

Proposition 4 ( is -complete). and every satisfies .

Proof. By induction. : is (c.e.) and -complete for by the -completeness of 42.04.03. Step: assume is -complete. By Proposition 3 the sets are exactly the c.e.-in- sets, and by jump theorem (ii) of 42.04.04 every set c.e. in is . Also is c.e. in , hence by Proposition 3. So is -complete.

Proposition 5 (the limit lemma). iff for a computable with values and the limit existing at each .

Proof. () With total and the canonical approximation , set to the value of the length- run if it converges with use , else . The true computation has finite use and converges by some stage; from the stage where and the run has converged, the use lemma 42.04.04 fixes permanently. () is , and the same for , so , hence by Post (Proposition 3 plus complementation).

Proposition 6 ( is -complete). and every set .

Proof. Membership: , prefix , so . Hardness: let , with computable; equivalently . By s-m-n build with enumerating : on a dovetailed search, put into when a with appears. Then is finite iff only finitely many have such a iff some tail of has — but to align with exactly, arrange instead to enumerate a marker for each failing up to the least witnessing , so is finite iff , i.e. iff . Thus , giving . Hence is -complete.

Proposition 7 (Tarski: truth is not arithmetical). is not for any .

Proof. Suppose were arithmetical, so definable by an arithmetical formula with . By the fixed-point lemma 42.01.09 pending applied to there is a sentence with . Then , a contradiction. So no arithmetical truth predicate exists, and since every arithmetical set is for some fixed , is in no . (That it computes every — decide a sentence by truth — places it strictly above each level.)

Connections Master

  • Turing reducibility, oracles, and the jump 42.04.04, the prerequisite, supplies the engine this unit reads syntactically: the iterated jumps defined there are, by Post's theorem proved here, exactly the -complete sets, and jump theorem (ii) — is -complete among -c.e. sets — is precisely the inductive step that lifts level- completeness to level . That unit owns the jump operator, relativisation, and the use lemma the proofs lean on; this unit owns the quantifier-alternation classification and the proof that it coincides with the jump ladder.

  • The priority method and Post's problem 42.04.06, co-produced, lives at the bottom two levels this unit charts: the sets are, by the limit lemma proved here (Proposition 5), exactly the limit-computable (-computable) sets, and the finite-injury constructions build c.e. () sets of incomparable degree by approximations whose finitely-many mind-changes are the limit-lemma's content. This unit owns the hierarchy and the limit lemma; that unit owns the priority constructions that populate the interval those approximations describe.

  • Gödel numbering and the incompleteness theorems 42.01.09 pending is the semantic counterpart this unit's Tarski theorem (Proposition 7) completes: provability in a c.e. theory is and incomplete, while truth is not arithmetical at all, and the same fixed-point lemma that produces the Gödel sentence produces the Liar that defeats an arithmetical truth predicate. That unit owns arithmetisation and the fixed-point lemma; this unit owns the placement of truth strictly above every level of the hierarchy and the contrast between undefinability and incompleteness.

  • Computably enumerable sets 42.04.03 sit at the base level this unit generalises: the projection characterisation of c.e. sets is the one-existential-quantifier base case, is the -complete set anchoring Post's induction, and the index sets classified here () are the higher-level analogues of the creative-set completeness phenomenon of that unit. That unit owns the structure theory; this unit lifts completeness and the diagonal to every finite level and beyond.

Historical & philosophical context Master

The arithmetical hierarchy was isolated by Stephen Kleene in the early 1940s, in his work on the predicates definable in arithmetic by alternating number quantifiers over a recursive matrix, and independently approached by Andrzej Mostowski, after whom the classification is sometimes called the Kleene-Mostowski hierarchy [Rogers Ch. 14]. Kleene proved the enumeration and hierarchy theorems showing the levels are distinct and introduced the iterated jump; the identification of the syntactic hierarchy with the jump ladder is Post's theorem, announced in Emil Post's 1948 abstract "Degrees of recursive unsolvability" and developed in the Post-Kleene circle, tying definability complexity to the degrees of unsolvability of 42.04.04. Alfred Tarski's 1933 theorem on the undefinability of truth — that the set of true arithmetic sentences is not arithmetically definable — predates the hierarchy but receives its sharpest recursion-theoretic form here, as the statement that lies above every .

The continuation past the finite levels is Kleene's again: his 1955 papers on the hyperarithmetical hierarchy and the system of notations for the recursive ordinals extended the jump iteration transfinitely to , and the Kleene-Souslin theorem identified the hyperarithmetical sets with , the effective analogue of the Borel sets. The analytical hierarchy, with quantifiers over functions, was developed by Kleene and Mostowski and refined through the 1960s by the work of Spector, Gandy, and Addison connecting effective descriptive set theory to the classical Borel and projective hierarchies; itself is -complete. The arithmetical hierarchy thus stands at the junction of three traditions: the recursion theory of Post and Kleene, the definability theory of Tarski and Mostowski, and the descriptive set theory of Souslin and Luzin, with Post's theorem the hinge that makes quantifier complexity and computational difficulty a single graded invariant.

Bibliography Master

@article{post1948degrees,
  author  = {Post, Emil L.},
  title   = {Degrees of recursive unsolvability: preliminary report},
  journal = {Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society},
  volume  = {54},
  year    = {1948},
  pages   = {641--642}
}

@article{kleene1943recursive,
  author  = {Kleene, Stephen C.},
  title   = {Recursive predicates and quantifiers},
  journal = {Transactions of the American Mathematical Society},
  volume  = {53},
  number  = {1},
  year    = {1943},
  pages   = {41--73}
}

@article{mostowski1947definable,
  author  = {Mostowski, Andrzej},
  title   = {On definable sets of positive integers},
  journal = {Fundamenta Mathematicae},
  volume  = {34},
  year    = {1947},
  pages   = {81--112}
}

@article{tarski1936wahrheitsbegriff,
  author  = {Tarski, Alfred},
  title   = {Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen},
  journal = {Studia Philosophica},
  volume  = {1},
  year    = {1936},
  pages   = {261--405},
  note    = {English: The concept of truth in formalized languages}
}

@article{kleene1955hierarchies,
  author  = {Kleene, Stephen C.},
  title   = {On the forms of the predicates in the theory of constructive ordinals (second paper)},
  journal = {American Journal of Mathematics},
  volume  = {77},
  number  = {3},
  year    = {1955},
  pages   = {405--428}
}

@article{kleene1955arithmetical,
  author  = {Kleene, Stephen C.},
  title   = {Arithmetical predicates and function quantifiers},
  journal = {Transactions of the American Mathematical Society},
  volume  = {79},
  number  = {2},
  year    = {1955},
  pages   = {312--340}
}

@article{addison1959separation,
  author  = {Addison, John W.},
  title   = {Separation principles in the hierarchies of classical and effective descriptive set theory},
  journal = {Fundamenta Mathematicae},
  volume  = {46},
  year    = {1959},
  pages   = {123--135}
}

@book{soare2016turing,
  author    = {Soare, Robert I.},
  title     = {Turing Computability: Theory and Applications},
  series    = {Theory and Applications of Computability},
  publisher = {Springer},
  year      = {2016}
}

@book{rogers1967theory,
  author    = {Rogers, Hartley},
  title     = {Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability},
  publisher = {McGraw-Hill},
  year      = {1967}
}

@book{hinman1978recursion,
  author    = {Hinman, Peter G.},
  title     = {Recursion-Theoretic Hierarchies},
  series    = {Perspectives in Mathematical Logic},
  publisher = {Springer},
  year      = {1978}
}

@book{odifreddi1989classical,
  author    = {Odifreddi, Piergiorgio},
  title     = {Classical Recursion Theory, Volume I},
  series    = {Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics},
  volume    = {125},
  publisher = {North-Holland},
  year      = {1989}
}